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1 INTR0DUCI10N 
The managed funds industry at 31 March 1992 had some $2.88 billion under 
management. 1 Within the group of services offered and collectively called managed 
funds2, unit trusts have witnessed an exponential growth since 19853 and at 31 March 
1992 comprised nearly $1.4 billion of investors' money. The majority of investors are 
individual (as opposed to corporate) investors. 
A unit trust is a collection of many investors' funds, pooled together to form an 
enterprise, and managed by professional managers with the aim of providing the 
investors with a high rate of return on their money at low risk. 
Unit trusts have many attractions to investors. First, by pooling the resources of 
numerous investors, unit trusts can provide to those investors with relatively small 
amounts to invest, the benefits of wide ranging and diversified investment portfolios.4 
Secondly, unit trusts have the benefit of constant professional expertise at a cost to 
the collective of investors comparatively lower than would be available to investors 
individually.5 Thirdly, the units issued to investors are generally transferable and 
redeemable, enabling investors to have ready access to their funds. 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Statistics were provided by the Financial Planning Group to Mr R S Carr, Chief Manager BNZ Retail 
Financial Services and presented at the nationwide BNZ Trust Group Seminars by R S Carr "The 
Managed Funds Industry in New Zealand Past, Present and Future Prospects Present and Future 
Developments" (Unpublished, seminar paper, Wellington, June 1992). See also Financial Alert 
Bulletin (29.6.92) Vol 7 Issue 7, 1. 
Other services included in the figures are Insurance Bonds, Group Investment Funds, Personal 
Superannuation Plans, above nl , 2. 
Refer to Appendix I whicl1 sets out a graph of the growth of unit trust funds in New Zealand since 
1985; see above nl Slide 9. 
There are a variety of portfolio options that investors can choose, ranging from foreign equities to 
New Zealand property unit trusts, or a mixture of several investment options. 
Unit trusts are treated as companies for tax purJX>ses, by virtue of the dividend imputation scheme 
the double taxation of income earned and distributed by unit trusts is avoided (s2 11 Income Tax Act 
1976). 
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Although unit trusts have witnessed a growth in popularity, the legal framework 
under which they operate is unsatisfactory. That framework6 is an amalgamation of a 
number of statutes, and of equitable and common law principles, all of which fail to 
clearly define the duties of the trustees and the managers of unit trusts creating 
uncertainty. These uncertainties mean that managers and trustees are potentially liable 
for breaches of statutory and fiduciary duty. Furthermore, the lack of a clearly 
defined code has led to a duplication of work by trustees and managers resulting in 
excessive cost structures. 
The author's concerns may be summarised: 
(i) There is significant potential for liability on the trustee of a unit trust by virtue of 
the use of the term "trustee" and a misconception about the real functions and 
duties of the trustee . 
(ii) There is insufficient awareness among managers of the extent of their functions 
and duties. Many managers are overly concerned with obtaining a share of the 
booming market without assessing their potential liability. 
(iii) The unit trust legislation is imprecise in its conceptual framework and fails to 
provide trustees and managers with sufficient certainty and as a result, does not 
provide investors with the protection it was designed to achieve. 
(iv) In considering the unit trust transaction courts should be more ready to 
recognise the distinction between traditional trusts and unit trusts and also 
need to understand how unit trusts work in commercial and practical terms. 
This paper discusses these concerns with specific analysis of the trustee's duties of 
supervision, and the manager's functions and duties in selling units to investors and 
investing the unit trust funds, and attempts to clearly define these respective duties. 
The paper also examines the regulation of units trusts in Australia and presents 
suggestions for refom1. 
6 Below 3.0 for a discussion of the statutory framework and below 4.0 for a discussion of the func-
tions and powers of the manager and the trustee . 
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2 THE UNIT TRUST 
2.1 Structure and Workings 
A unit trust is defined in Section 2 of the Unit Trusts Act 1960 as 
any scheme or arrangement, whether made before or after the 
commencement of this Act, that is made for the purpose or has the effect 
of providing facilities for the participation, as beneficiaries under a trust, by 
subscribers or purchasers as members of the public ... , in income and 
gains (whether in the nature of capital or income) arising from the money, 
investments and other property that are for the time being subject to the 
trust. 7 
A unit trust results from the creation of an express trust8 constituted under a deed of 
trust ("the unit trust deed").9 The manager is the initiator of the transaction and is 
generally the settlor of the trust (or is closely associated with the settlor). Property10 is 
made subject to the trust and, by the terms of the Unit Trusts Act , that property is 
required to be vested in an independent trustee11 for the benefit of, and on behalf of, 
the beneficiaries.12 
7 
8 
9 
The only reported case in New Zealand which discusses the definition of a unit trust is Re Mortgage 
Management Ltd (1964] NZLR 576.Section 2(a)-(g) Unit Trusts Act 1960 excludes: (a) trust for the 
benefit of debenture holders; (b) conunon funds of the Public Trustee; (c) conunon funds of the 
Maori Trustee; (d) group investment funds under the Trustee Companies Act 1967; (e) friendly 
societies; (f) superannuation schemes registered under the Superannuation Schemes Act 1989,(g) 
employee share purchase schemes. 
Like any other trust, a unit trust must be established with certainty of intention, object and subject 
matter. For a general discussion of the three certainties see J K Maxton Nevi/l's Laws of Trusts, Wills 
and Administration in New Zea/a11d (8 ed , Butterworths, Wellington, 1985), 22-29 ; H A J Ford and W 
A Lee below n 66, 504 . 
Section 9 Unit Trusts Act 1960 requires an authenticated copy of the trust deed to be lodged with the 
District Registrar. 
JO The use of the words "investments" and "property" throughout this paper includes all "investments 
and other property" as defined in s2 Unit Trusts Act 1960. 
11 Sections 3(4) , 4 and 5 Unit Trusts Act 1960. 
12 Section 8(1)(a) Unit Trusts Act 1960 provides that no units may be offered to the public until a trustee 
has been appointed. 
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The beneficial interest is divided into units which initially are held by the manager. 
The manager in tum promotes13 the sale of the units14 to investors. As investors 
subscribe for units the size of the trust property increases and the beneficial interest 
in the trust will be divided into more units. 
The subscribers in purchasing the units become "unitholders". Unitholders do not 
have any proprietary interest in any particular asset of the unit trust fund. 15 Instead 
the units bought represent a direct beneficial ownership of the collective property of 
the unit trust fund and a right against the trustee to receive repayment of monies 
invested in proportion to the units held. 16 
For its efforts the manager obtains remuneration and pays few expenses for the 
setting up or continuing administration of the unit trust. These costs are generally 
paid by the unit trust fund. 17 
13 Below 5.1 where the relationship of the manager to unitholders when selling units is discussed. 
14 The offering, issuing and selling of the units to the public is governed by the Unit Trusts Act 1960 
and not the Securities Act 1978. See below 3.4 where the Securities Act 1978 is discussed. 
15 A Unit trust may be compared with a Company, however a company is a distinct and legal person (a 
trust is not) and holds property in its own right. Shares held by shareholders do not represent any 
legal or equitable interest in the company's property. For a discussion on the difference between a 
share in a company and a unit held in a unit trust see Charles v Federal Commissioner of Taxation 
(1954) 90 CLR 598, 609; H AJ Ford "Unit Trusts" (1960) 3 MLR 129,130-133. It is uncertain whether 
unit holders would be liable for undischarged liabilities of the trustee or manager if those liabilities 
exceeded the trustee and managers assets; compare Rita Joan Diaries Ltd v Thomson (1974) 1 NZLR 
285; JM Broomhead (Vic) Pty Ltd (In Liquidation) v J W Broomhead Pty Ltd and Ors 3 ACLC 335 and 
McLean v Burns Philp Trustee Co Pty Ltd (1985) 9 ACLR 926. 
16 Costa & Duppe Properties Pty Ltd v Duppe (19861 VR 90. 
17 Management fees range from 1-2% of the gross asset value of the fund . There are additional costs 
including purchasing, switching, selling, cash management fees plus the payment by the trust of 
legal, audit, printing, certificate , register fees and any other fees reasonably incurred. 
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The manager of the unit trust is charged with the management and day to day 
administration of the trust property on the terms set out or implied into the unit trust 
deed. 18 The trustee on the other hand has little to do with the administration of the 
unit trust fund. The trustee holds the title to the trust property and assumes a 
"watchdog" role over the manager. 19 The trustee's presence enables the manager to 
market the unit trust as a "safe" investment, with many prospectus documents 
representing the trustee to be the investors' guardian angel. The trustee is 
remunerated for carrying out these functions. 20 
The transaction may be simply illustrated: 
INVESTMENrt1 P-OR.TFOUO 
I Return Investment of t 
trust funds 'f on investment 
I MANAGER 
Funds t t t t t t t t 
I INVESTORS 
Investors' 
funds 
18 Below 6.0 where !he managers duties are discussed. 
19 Below 7.0 where !he trustees duties are discussed . 
I Title to 'f trust property 
TRUSTEE 
20 Trustee fees are generally about 0.1% of !he gross asset value of the fund. In addition fees are payable 
on the termination of the trust. 
5 
This paper discusses "flexible" ( as opposed to "fixed" ) unit trusts. In a "flexible" 
unit trust the manager and trustee have the power under the unit trust deed to vary 
the nature and proportions of the property comprising the trust fund. However, such 
variation is limited to those investments authorised in the unit trust deed. Under a 
"fixed" unit trust, the portfolio and proportions of investment are fixed. The first 
portfolio of investments is described as a unit and the beneficial interest is divided 
into sub-units. 21 
21 H A J Ford "Unit Trusts" (1960) 3 MLR 129. 
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3 THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK 
3.1 The Unit Trusts Act 1960 
The Unit Trusts Act 1960 ( "the Unit Trusts Act") regulates the selling of units in a 
unit trust by prospectus22, and provides for the management by the manager23, and 
the supervision by the trustee24, of the unit trust. 
The Unit Trusts Act is not a code in itself rather, it provides the structure for a unit 
trust and places on the manager and trustee certain functions, powers and duties. The 
policy objective of the Unit Trusts Act is to give unitholders a measure of protection 
which is substantially similar to that enjoyed by shareholders in a company and in 
furtherance of this objective25 places certain supervisory functions in the hands of the 
trustee of the unit trust. 26 Several other statutes apply in conjunction with the Unit 
Trusts Act and these statutes are discussed in this chapter . 
3.2 Trustee Companies Act 1967 
The policy objective of the Unit Trusts Act to protect investors in unit trusts, is evident 
in the requirement that every trustee of a unit trust scheme be a trustee corporation
27 
22 Section 7 Unit Trusts Act and the Schedule to the Unit Trusts Act set out the statutory requirements 
which must be included in any prospectus offering units to the public. 
23 Below 4.1 and 6.0 where the manager's functions and duties are discussed . 
24 Below 4.2 and 7.0 where the trustee's functions and duties are discussed. 
25 See Parliamentary Debates 324 (30 August 1960), 1923; and 325 (19 October 1960) 3086. 
26 Explanatory Note Unit Trusts Bill 1960. 
27 Section 2 Trustee Companies Act 1967 sets out which companies are trustee companies for the 
purpose of the Trustee Companies Act 1967. Every trustee company is deemed to be a trustee 
corporation for the purpose of the Trustee Act 1956, however, it should be noted that not all trustee 
corporations are trustee companies. See s2 Trustee Act 1956 and s2 Trustee Companies Act 1967 for 
the definitions of trustee corporation and trustee company, respectively. 
28 Section 5(1)(b) Unit Trusts Act 1960. 
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or a company or bank approved for that purpose by the supervising Minister. 28 
A trustee company which accepts appointment as a trustee of a unit trust scheme29 is 
subject to the statutory obligations imposed on it by the Trustee Companies Act30 and 
the Trustee Act. 31 
In discharging any of the duties imposed on it, the trustee is entitled to claim 
remuneration for its services32. However, the trustee company's capital and assets are 
charged with any liability the trustee company incurs as a result of failing to fulfil the 
duties imposed upon it by the trust deed, equity, common law, or any Act. 33 
3.3 Trustee Act 1956 
The provisions of the Trustee Act 1956 ("the Trustee Act") are implied into the 
operation of all trusts including unit trusts34 , unless expressly excluded by a trust 
instrument. 
The powers conferred by the Trustee Act on a trustee, whether it is a corporation or 
not, 35 are additional to the powers given to the trustee by a trust instrument or any 
other Act unless the contrary is expressly stated in the trust instrument or that Act.36 
29 Section 7(2)(p) Trustee Companies Act 1967 authorises trustee companies to be trustees of unit trusts. 
30 1967. 
31 Section 3(1)(b) Trustee Companies Act 1967. 
32 Section 18 Trustee Companies Act 1967. 
33 Section 6(1) Trustee Companies Act 1967. The trustee and manager cannot seek indemnity from the 
unitholders for failing to perform their functions and duties; s24 Unit Trusts Act 1960. 
34 Section 2(3) Trustee Act 1956. 
35 Sections 2(4) and (5) make a distinction between trustees which are corporations and trustees which 
are not corporations. Trustees which are corporations should be distinguished from "trustee corpora-
tions" which are defined in s2. The manager is a trustee which is a corporation for the purposes of the 
Trustee Act 1956 because s4 Unit Trusts Act 1960 requires the manager to be a public company. 
Similarly the trustee will be a trustee that is a corporation and may also be a "trustee corporation". 
36 Section 2(5)(a) and (b) Trustee Act 1956. 
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In the unit trust transaction, the Trustee Act applies to both the trustee (as a trustee 
company) and to the manager because the manager when exercising its powers and 
functions 37 must exercise those powers and functions as a trustee. 38 
The Trustee Act authorises trustees to undertake a number of activities, whether 
provided for in the trust instrument or not, but implies certain duties of care, skill and 
diligence into the carrying out of those activities.39 
3.4 Securities Act 1978 
The Unit Trusts Act is the only major piece of fundraising legislation that was not 
replaced by the Securities Act 1978 ("the Securities Act" ).40 
The Securities Act regulates the issuing, allotting and selling of securities to the public 
by requiring disclosure of certain information in a prospectus and by restricting the 
content of advertisements for securities. The purpose of the Securities Act is to 
provide investors with a high standard of information to ensure investors are 
informed of the nature of their investments. The Securities Act deals with issues of 
debt, equity and participatory securities.41 
Unit trusts are excluded from the statutory requirement for a prospectus under the 
Securities Act.42 However, the Securities Act and Securities Regulations43 which relate 
37 Below 4.1. where the powers and functions of the manager are discussed. 
38 Below 6.0 where the manager's duties are discussed. 
39 Above n 19. See also above n33 regarding the managers' right to indemnity. 
40 
41 
For a good discussion of the Securities Act 1978 see Darvell and Clarke Securities !Aw in New 
Zealand (Butterworths Wellington 1983); see also New Zealand Company !Aw and Practice, (Com-
merce Clearing House Reporter) Volume 1, Ch 7. 
For a definition of Debt, Equity and Participatory Securities see s2 Securities Act 1978. 
42 Section 5(2A) exempts unit trusts from ss 33(3), 37, 37A, 39 to 44, and 44B to 54 of the Securities Act 
1978. 
43 1983. 
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to the content of advertisements,44 the Registrars powers of inspection,45 and the 
liability and offence provisions46 still apply to unit trusts. 
The Securities Act was enacted after the Unit Trusts Act and therefore, it can only be 
assumed that it was the belief of the legislature that the provisions of the Unit Trusts 
Act, relating to the content of unit trust prospectuses, provided sufficient information 
and protection to investors. 
Although a unit trust transaction does not fall clearly within the definition of debt or 
equity securities in the Securities Act, unit trusts could be classified as participatory 
securities. As the policy of the Unit Trusts Act is to protect investors it is the author's 
view that this goal would be more appropriately achieved by adopting requirements 
of more stringent disclosure and more full and accurate information, especially in 
respect of fees payable by unitholders.47 This could be achieved by amending the 
Schedule to the Unit Trusts Act and analysing what requirements of the Securities Act 
may also be appropriate to include in the schedule.
48 
Many managers have commented that with respect to disclosure of information the 
industry standard is much higher than that required by the Unit Trusts Act and on 
par with the Securities Act requirements. The author disagrees. Many of the New 
Zealand prospectus documents (as opposed to Australian and UK prospectuses on the 
whole) are little more than company profiles with the management fees tucked away 
in fine print in the middle of the document. The list of authorised investments, 
coupled with the manager's statement of its objectives, are often inconsistent with the 
investment guidelines issued by the trustee. On the whole, the standard is 
unsatisfactory. 
44 Sections 38, 38A, 44A Securities Act 1978 and Part II Securities Regulations 1983. 
45 Sections 66 - 70A Securities Act 1978. 
46 Sections 55 - 65 Securities Act 1978. 
47 Compare s39 Securities Act 1978 and Third Schedule Securities Regulations 1983 with s7 Unit Trusts 
Act and the Schedule to t11e Unit Trusts Acl. 
48 Refer toss 41, 42, 43, 44 Securities Act 1978. See below nl60. 
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4 THE FUNCTIONS AND POWERS OF THE MANAGER AND 
TRUSTEE 
The extent of the duties owed by the manager and the trustee in carrying out their 
respective functions and powers are discussed later. The powers and functions 
required to be exercised by each party under the terms of the Unit Trusts Act may be 
summarised as follows. 
4.1 The Manager's Functions and Powers 
4.1.1 The manager performs the function (whether as a principal or by an 
agent) of issuing or offering units in a unit trust to the public for 
subscription or purchase or inviting the public to subscribe for or 
purchase units, or both of these functions.
49 
4.1.2 Upon the purchase of units by an investor, the manager must issue a 
certificate as evidence of the investor's interest.
50 
4.1.3 The manager must pay all money received from investors into a 
51 
separate bank account and pay that money to the trustee. 
4.1.4 The manager must file annual audited accounts with the District 
Registrar, a list of unit holders for the relevant period, and a list of the 
distributions made to those unitholders.
52 
49 Section 3(2)(b) Unit Trusts Act 1960; see above n 22 for the statutory requirements which need to be 
included in any unit trust prospectus. 
50 Section 13 Unit Trusts Act 1960; 111e certificate must be authorised in writing by the manager but 
given by the Trustee or someone other than the manager. 
51 Section 14 Unit Trusts Act; All money received by the manager and required to be paid to the trustee 
becomes subject to the trust upon receipt of that money by the manager (or its agent). 
52 Section 20 Unit Trusts Act 1960. 
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4.1.5 The manager must also lodge an authenticated copy of the trust deed 
with the District Registrar .53 
4.1.6 The manager has the powers of management of the investments and 
other property that are subject to the unit trust. 54 
4.2 The Trustee's Functions and Powers 
4.2.1 The trustee ( or its associated company ) must have vested in it the 
investments and other property that are from time to time subject to 
the unit trust. 55 
4.2.2 The trustee must hold the register of unitholders.56 
4.2.3 The trustee must cause proper accounts to be kept, either by the 
trustee or the manager, and send annual accounts to unitholders.57 
4.2.4 The trustee must also supervise the manager in carrying out its powers 
in respect of management. 
53 Section 9 Unit Trusts Act 1960. 
54 Section 3(2)(a) Unit Trusts Act 1960. 
55 Section 3(3) Unit Trusts Act 1960. 
56 Above n 55. 
57 Section 11 Unit Trusts Act 1960. 
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5 THE MANAGER AND TRUSTEE RELATIONSHIP VIS-A-VIS 
UNITHOIDERS 
The manager's functions and duties as set out in 4.1 may be divided into two broad 
categories: 
(i) the functions and powers of offering and selling units; and 
(ii) the functions and powers associated with the management of the unit trust fund . 
The powers and functions of the manager raise the question of what is the 
relationship between the manager and the trustee in carrying out these powers and 
functions? 
The answer to this question will identify which party unitholders have recourse to in 
the event of a unit trust collapsing. From the trustee's and manager's point of view, a 
definition of the trustee/ manager relationship is essential so that each understands 
and is fully aware of its potential liability and takes the appropriate precautions to 
guard against being implicated for any breach of trust, negligence,58 default or 
dishonesty of the other party. 
The relationship of the manager and trustee is discussed below by reference to the 
two broad categories stated above. 
5.1 Selling of Units 
The function of issuing or offering units to the public for subscription or purchase is 
placed upon the manager (either as a principal or by an agent) by the Unit Trusts 
Act. 59 Although the Unit Trusts Act uses the word "principal", it is unclear what the 
managers' capacity is in offering and selling units, vis-a-vis unitholders. Is the 
manager in fact a principal, or is it an agent, and if so, of whom? 
58 Below 8.0 where the liability of the manager and trustee is discussed. 
59 Above 4.1.1 where the manager's functions are discussed . 
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5.1.1 Agency 
The relationship of agent and principal may be defined as a fiduciary relationship 
which existing between two persons, one of whom (the principal) expressly or 
impliedly consents to the other (the agent) acting on its behalf, and the agent 
consents to so act. 60 
The manager in offering and selling units to the public cannot be an agent of the trust 
itself because the trust is not a legal person at Jaw. However, it may be argued that 
the manager is an agent of the trustee, whose duty it is to get in and hold the trust 
property. This argument may be further supported by the following factors: 
(i) In the normal case, the manager does not initially own any of the units which it 
offers to sell (although it may hold them in a 'float') rather, unit certificates are 
issued as the demand for them arises. 
(ii) Any money that is received from investors by the manager is received on behalf 
of the trustee. 
Thus, the manager may be said to be the agent of the trustee by procuring investors 
to enter into a relationship with the trustee as beneficiary.61 
5.1.2 Principal 
Although the relationship between the manager and the trustee vis-a-vis unitholders 
could be classified as an agency relationship, that classification is undesirable for a 
number of reasons. 
6o F.M.B. Reynolds Bowstead on Agency (Sed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1985), 1. 
61 R Stewart "Unit Trusts - Legal Rel:ltionships of Trustee, Manager and Unitholders" (1988) C&SLJ 269, 
271. 
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First, in commercial reality,62 the manager is the primary instigator or entrepreneur of 
the investment scheme, without which there would be no unit trust63. As a result, the 
manager has a direct contractual relationship with investors. 
Secondly, the prospectus, which is issued to attract investors, generally contains 
application forms, addressed to the manager, for the investors to fill out covenanting 
with the manager that the investor will be bound by the unit trust deed. Such an 
application also requires a cheque to be sent with the application, payable to the 
order of the manager. The manager then has a discretion to either accept or decline 
the investor's application, without reference to the trustee. 
Thirdly, the Unit Trusts Act recognises that the manager is a principal64 and 
contemplates that the manager will be contracting directly with investors in selling 
units. This is evidenced by the fact that the manager is responsible to unitholders for 
its acts and omissions in selling and issuing units as if it were a trustee.65 
The use of the word 'principal' by definition cannot mean the manager is the trust 
itself, as a trust is not a legal person. Rather the term means that the manager is in a 
direct contractual relationship with the investors. 
It is the author's view that not only does the Unit Trusts Act provide that the manager, 
in offering and selling units to the public, is a principal, but also that it makes 
commercial sense for this to be the case. If the manager were the agent of the trustee, 
any acts, defaults, or misrepresentations made by the manager (or its agents) would 
make the trustee liable as a principal. Such a proposition would lead to higher 
trustee's fees and even a reluctance by the trustee companies to act as trustees. 
62 Graham Australia Pty Ltd v Corporate West Management Pty Ltd & A nor l ACSR 682, 687 where 
Brooking J proceeded on the basis, which his honour believed was sound, that the manager was in a 
direct contractual relationship with unitholders. 
63 Parkes Management Ltd v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd and P.T Ltd (1977) ACLC 29,545, 29,551. 
64 Section 3(2)(b) Unit Trusts Act 1960. 
65 Section 3(2)(c) Unit Trusts Act l 960; see below 6.0 where the manager's duties are discussed. 
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5.2 Management of Unit Trust 
The manager of a unit trust in carrying out its functions and exercising its powers of 
management could be seen as either an agent of the trustee or as a co-trustee under 
traditional trust law principles ("traditional trust law''). 
5.2.1 Agency 
Under traditional trust law trust property is vested in a trustee who is required to 
administer the trust property in accordance with the terms of the trust, in an impartial 
manner and for the benefit of the cestuis que trust. In that relationship, many 
fiduciary duties are implied 66 one of which is the duty to act personally and not to 
delegate duties or decisions that may be performed by the trustee.67 
The trustee may employ agents to assist in arriving at a decision or to carry that 
decision into effect68 once it has been made by the trustee.69 However the trustee may 
not employ an agent to make a decision required to be made by it. The trustee must, 
therefore, employ a proper person to act and continue to supervise the agent's work.70 
Under traditional trust law, the manager would be seen as an agent of the trustee but 
it is apparent that the powers and functions of the manager do not fit within the 
traditional trust principles. 
66 For a good discussion on trustee 's duties see HA J Ford and WA Lee Principles of the Law o/Trnsts 
(2ed, The Law Book Company Ltd 1990), Ch 9; PD Finn, Fiduciary Obligation, (The Law Book 
Company Ltd , 1977); W F Fratcher Scott on Trnsts (4ed, Little Brown and Company, Boston), Vo! II , 
para 187. 
67 Turner v Corney (1841) 5 Bear 525; There are exceptions to this rule: (a) where delegation is 
permitted by statute, see ss 28, 29, 31 Trustee Act 1956; (b) where delegation is permitted by the trust 
deed; (c) necessity, see Speight v Gaunt (1883) 9 App Cas 1. 
68 Section 29(1) Trustee Act 1956. 
69 For a discussion on the liability of trustees for the acts of agents see J Maxton Nevill's Law of Trnsts, 
Wills and Administration i11 New Zealand (Bed, Butterworths, 1985), 185; H A J Ford and W A Lee 
above n 66, 444. 
7° Fry v Tapson (1884) 28 Ch D 268; Carruthers v Caruthers (18%) AC 659; Wyman v Paterson (190()] AC 
271. 
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Toe reasons for this are that the manager, in carrying out its management functions, is 
the active party in the unit trust transaction, making daily decisions and exercising 
powers of management. It would be unduly expensive and commercially impractical 
for the trustee of the unit trust to consider the advice of the manager and to approve 
that advice before the manager could act in each case. 
Thus, the manager in carrying out its managerial functions should not be viewed as 
an agent of the trustee. 
5.2.2 Co-Trustee 
A manager when exercising its powers and functions in managing the unit trust fund 
must exercise those powers and functions as a trustee.71 Traditional trust law would 
dictate that the existence of more than one trustee makes the trustees co-trustees, and 
all decisions that are required to be made must be done so unanimously.72 Co-
trustees occupy a joint office73 and one trustee cannot make a decision without the 
authorisation of the other trustees. 74 Consequently a co-trustee's liability is joint and 
several so that a passive trustee is prima fade liable for any breach of trust committed 
b . 75 y an active trustee. 
It would be unduly burdensome on a trustee of a unit trust to make it potentially 
liable for every decision and act of the manager in the daily management of a unit 
trust, unless such an act was manifestly not in the best interests of unitholders.76 It 
would be equally burdensome to require that every decision made should be made 
unanimously. 
71 Above n 65. 
72 IAke v South Kensington Hotel Co (1879) 11 ChD 121, 125. 
73 Jn the Fstate of \Villiamjust [1973] 7 SASR 508, 513. 
74 Lee v Sanke;.(1873) LR 15 Eq 204. 
75 Babin v Hughes (1886) 31 ChD 390, 396. 
76 Below 7.1 where trustees duty of supervision is discussed. 
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5.3 Dichotomy of Functions Powers and Duties 
The relationship of the manager and the trustee of a unit trust is different to the 
traditional trust law relationship between trustee and agent or between co-trustees. 
There is no concept in equity that trustees may divide duties among themselves, 
unless expressly provided for by the trust instrument, so that one trustee performs 
some functions and the other trustee other functions. 
In the unit trust transaction there is a dichotomy of powers, functions and duties 
between the manager and trustee akin to the statutory exception (that there cannot be 
a division of duties) in section SO of the Trustee Act. That section enables a 
corporation to be appointed as a custodian trustee for the sole purpose and with the 
sole function of getting in and holding the trust property. Any investments made by 
the custodian trustee are at the managing trustee's direction.77 The custodian trustee 
is in a fiduciary relationship with the managing trustee78 but its liability is limited to its 
own actions and does not extend to the acts or defaults of the managing trustee.79 
The Unit Trusts Act recognises the division of roles between the manager and the 
trustee by providing that the manager shall be liable for its own acts and omissions in 
the exercise of its powers and functions as it would if it exercised those powers and 
functions as a trustee.80 
It is submitted that the terms "managing trustee" and "custodian trustee" are in fact 
better descriptions for the relationship between the manager and the trustee, and that 
the use of these ( or similar terms) would provide investors with a better 
understanding of the parties' functions and duties. Most managers would object to 
being renamed managing trustees. Generally, the image managers portray in 
77 Section 50(2)(c) Trustee Act 1956. 
78 Re Brooke Bond & Co Ltd's Trust Deed (1963] Ch 357. 
79 Section 50(2)(f) Trustee Act 1956. 
80 Above n 65. 
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prospectus documents is the professional service that they offer, down-playing and 
often not mentioning that they have any duties to investors, because of the 
connotations that the word "trust" gives to the public. 
In Australia, the statute regulating unit trusts81 does not impose the duties of a trustee 
on a manager. However, the Australian courts have recognised on a number of 
occasions82 the division of managerial and custodial functions. The statement of 
Young J in Re Application of Permanent Trustee Nominees (Canberra) Ltd correctly 
summarises the trustee/ manager relationship in Australia and New Zealand 
It must thus be realised that trusts such as the present constitute a special 
species of trust where the power to manage and what I might call the 
"watchdog powers" are deliberately compartmentalised.83 
The trustee and manager are not in any hierarchy, rather they occupy co-ordinate 
offices, each being responsible for complimentary duties, the supervision of the other 
for the protection of unitholders, and providing mutual "checks and balances". 
81 Coporations Law Part 7.12 Div. 5 
82 Parkes Management Ltd v Perpetual Tmstee Co & PT Ltd 0977) ACLC 29,545, 29,551; Elders Trustee 
and Executor Co Ltd v Reeves (EG) Pty Ltd and Ors (1987) 78 ALR 193; Re Application of Permanent 
Trustee Nominees (Cauberra) Ltd, (NSW, Supreme Court) Unreported, 24 June 1985 cited by D 
Brewster "Fiduciary Obligations of Trust Manager and the Takeover of Unit Trusts" (1990) C&SLJ 303, 
315; Telford Property Fund and A nor v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd, Unreported, 28 February 1985 cited 
in R Stewart "Unit Trusts - Legal Relationships of Trustee, Manager and Unitholders" 0988) C&SLJ 
269, 274. 
83 Above n 82. 
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6 THE MANAGER'S DUTIES TO THE INVESTORS, 
UNITHOIDERS AND THE TRUSTEE 
To outline the functions and powers of the manager84 , and the relationship between 
the manager and trustee85 does not however define the manager's duties at law to the 
public (as potential investors), unitholders, and the trustee, in offering and selling 
units and managing the trust fund. 
6.1 The Manager's Duties to Investors in Offering and Selling 
Units 
It has been noted that when accepting an offer from an investor for units the manager 
is in a direct contractual relationship with that investor. However, before the 
manager accepts that offer from investors, it is unclear what duties, if any, the 
manager owes to the public. 
Section 3(2)(c) Unit Trusts Act provides that a manager, in carrying out its functions 
and powers as a manager (one of which is to offer and sell units) , must exercise 
those powers and functions as a trustee. 
6.1.1 Trustee To Whom 
The first question that arises is, to whom does the manager owe a duty as a trustee 
towards? Under traditional trust law the trustee is a trustee to the beneficiaries (in this 
case unitholders). It is arguable that the manager owes the duties of a trustee to the 
public, who are potential unitholders in a unit trust because arguably the Act deems 
them to be beneficiaries. 
84 Above 4.0 where manager's functions are discussed. 
85 Above 5.0 where trustee's functions are discussed . 
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Traditional trust law recognises that a trust can be created for beneficiaries not yet in 
existence86 and a trust will not fail for lack of certainty provided that the beneficiaries 
able to enforce the trust, are ascertainable. 
As long as the trust instrument shows how the beneficiaries are to be ascertained 
within the perpetuity period then the trust will be valid.87 
Unit trust deeds generally provide that the beneficiaries will come into existence and 
be ascertainable upon investors purchasing units in the trust and becoming a 
registered unitholder. Accordingly, the manager will be a trustee to registered 
unitholders as beneficiaries. 
It is submitted that it is not the intention of the Unit Trusts Act to deem potential 
unitholders to be beneficiaries, because potential unitholders in a unit trust cannot be 
seen as an ascertainable class of people able to enforce the trust. In this case, the 
trust would fail for lack of certainty.88 
86 Elliotv joicy[1935) AC 209. 
87 Re Flave/ WT[l969J l WLR 444. 
88 Inland Revenue Commissioner v Broadway Cottages (19551 Ch 20; McPhai/ v Dou/ton (1971) AC 424. 
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6.1.2 Duties to Investors and Unitholders 
As we have seen, the manager should be seen as owing the duties of a trustee to 
unitholders and cannot correctly be classified as a trustee to potential investors when 
offering and selling units. 
It is submitted that the extent of the manager's obligations to potential investors are 
set out in section 7 of the Unit Trusts Act which provides that before any interest in a 
unit trust is offered or issued to the public, the manager must set out certain 
information in a prospectus89 and must not mislead the public in fulfilling these 
requirements or in advertising any unit trust.90 The manager's activities come within 
the definition of 'promoter' and 'issuer' under the Securities Act,91 therefore, the 
manager will be liable for any misleading, deceptive, or false statements in any 
advertisements.92 
The manager does not therefore have a duty to disclose any more information than, 
that required by the Unit Trusts Act and Securities Act. However, many managers, at 
present, in offering and selling units to the public, could be seen at the 
pre-contractual stage, as owing a duty of care to potential investors either in equity or 
tort. The reason for this view is that many managers hold themselves out not only as 
89 Above n 22. 
90 Sections 44A, 55 Securities Act 1978. 
91 Section 2 provides that a "Promoter in relation to securities offered to the public for subscription (a) a 
person who is instrumental in the formulation of a plan or progranune pursuant to which the 
securities are offered to the public". 
92 Sections 55 - 59 Securities Act 1978; also ss 9, 13 Fair Trading Act 1981. The trustee is specificaly 
exempt from liability for ommisions or misstatements by the manager in respect of the prospectus 
documents by s7(5) Unit Trusts Act 1960. 
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professional managers but also as independent financial advisors to investors, 
discussing with investors their financial needs on the one hand and advocating their 
products to meet those needs on the other.93 
While the doctrine of caveat emptor may be argued to counter this view, it is 
submitted that the Unit Trusts Act and the Securities Act attempt to provide investors 
with as much protection as possible in purchasing units and securities, and that this 
protection (given the correct set of circumstances) would be extended in the form of 
equitable or tortuous duties where an investor, without warning to seek a second 
opinion, relies on a manager for advice and believes, that the manager is acting on 
behalf of the investor and in its best interests. 
An analogy may be drawn with the banker/customer relationship. The courts have 
generally held, that except in exceptional circumstances, a bank has no duty to advise 
or make inquiry of or explanation to a potential customer. However, where a 
relationship of reliance and confidence is established a bank may be liable in equity 
by virtue of a fiduciary relationship with the customer.94 
Similarly, a manager may be liable by virtue of a tortious duty of care where the 
manager voluntarily assumes responsibility for giving financial advice. As a 
consequence, the law imposes a duty on the manager to take proper professional 
care in formulating and delivering that advice.95 
93 "A fiduciary" is simply someone who undertakes to act for or on behalf of another in some particular 
matter. That undertaking may be of a general character. It may be specific and limited. It is immate-
rial whether the undertaking is or is not in the form of a contract. It is immaterial that the undertak-
ing is gratuitous. And the undertaking may be officiously assumed without request; P D Finn 
Fiduciary Obligations above n 66, 201. 
94 Wooos v Martins Bank Ltd (1959], 201 ; National Westminster Bank Pie v Morgan (1985) 2 WLR 588, 
829 Lord Scarman considered that explaining a document did not of itself create a fiduciary duty. 
95 Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd (19641 AC 465; Mutual Life & Citizens Assurance Co Ltd 
v Evatt (1971) AC 793; descenting judgment of Sir Robin Cooke in Tbe Royal Bank Trust Co (Trinidad 
Ltd) v Pampellonne (1987) 1 Lloyd's LR 218; Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 
CLR 447. The Consumer Guarantees Bill 1991 if enacted will enable investors to bring an action 
against financial advisors who are not "fit for the purpose" thereby eleviating the difficulty of proving 
a cause of action in tort or equity. 
LA\V LIBRARY 
~,,., U'i~:VES~ITY OF WELLII-JGTON VICTU; , .. , 
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6.2 Investment of Unit Trust Fund 
The manager owes the duties of a trustee to act in the best interests' of unitholders 
and in good faith, ensuring that its duties do not conflict with its own interests.96 
Thus, after accepting an investor's application to purchase units, the manager must act 
with due diligence, skill and care in the day to day administration of the trust fund 
and must exercise its best endeavours to ensure that the unit trust is managed in a 
proper and efficient manner. Furthermore, when the manager is required to exercise 
its judgment, it must do so reasonably.97 
When investing the trust funds the manager, must exercise the care that a prudent 
person, of similar skill and expertise, would when investing for others98 and, when 
redeeming units for unitholders, must act in the best interests of unitholders and not 
make an undisclosed profit. 
6.2.1 Duty to invest prudently 
Under the Unit Trusts Act the manager is responsible for the investment of the trust 
funds and must act as a trustee in carrying out that function. 99 The Trustee Act 
provides that a trustee (or in this case the manager) has the power to invest any trust 
funds in any property100 and that any investment may be varied from time to time.101 
9(i Bray v Ford [1896) AC 44,51. 
97 Section 12(1)(a) implies into every unit trust deed the requirement for a manager to use its best 
endeavours. 
98 Luciv v Fi//inou [ 1982] 2 CL 38 (CA) (unreported) cited in W F Fratcher Scott on Trost.5 above n 66. 
99 Section 3(2)(c). 
JOO Section 13A Trustee Act inserted by s3 Trustee Amendment Act 1988. 
IOI Section 13A(2) Trustee Act 1956. 
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This unlimited power of investment may, and is generally limited by the unit trust 
deeds so that trust funds can only be invested in "authorised investments"102. Often 
unit trust deeds will also provide for guidelines to be agreed upon between the 
trustee and the manager. These guidelines restrict the percentage of trust funds that 
can be invested by the manager in certain categories of the authorised investments at 
any one time. The purpose of these guidelines is discussed below.103 
Unless a unit trust deed expresses a contrary intention, 104 the manager in carrying out 
its powers of investment must exercise the care, diligence and skill that a prudent 
person of business would exercise in managing the affairs of others. 105 The manager 
is required to exercise a higher degree of care, diligence and skill in exercising its 
powers, because it possesses special skill in the investment area. 106 In any particular 
102 The authorised investments generally may be amended after agreement between the manager and 
the trustee. 
103 Below 7.1 for a discussion on the duty of the trustee to supervise the manager. 
104 Section 13D Trustee Act 1956. 
105 Section 13B Trustee Act 1956. TI1e prudent person rule found its origins in the Supreme Court of 
Massachusettes in Haroard College v Amory (26 Mass (9 Pick) 446 (1830)) and is used in some forty 
States of the United States of America (for an excellent comparison of the prudent man rule and the 
legal list approach see D Grosh "Trustee Investment" 0974) 23 ICLQ 748.). The rule expounded in 
that case was that the trustee must observe how men of prudence, discretion and intelligence 
manage their oum affairs. The prudent person rule was modified and adopted by the New Zealand 
Legislature in 1988 (inserted by s3 Trustee Amendment Act 1988) so that a trustee when investing 
must carry out its duties of investment as a prudent trustee would in investing for others. 
Due to the sinlilarity between the New Zealand and American rules, the American cases may be of 
some assistance in New Zealand in ascertaining what is prudent. But such cases should be read with 
caution for two reasons. First, there is a distinction between the New Zealand rule and the rule set 
out and adopted by many States in the Harvard case (see highlighted words above). Lindley LJ in Re 
Whiteley; Wbite/ey v Learoyd (1886) 33 ChD 347 stated correctly the distinction, at page 355, where 
His Honour said "The duty of a trustee is not to take such care only as a prudent man would take if 
he had only hin1self to consider, the duty is rather to take such care as an ordinary prudent man 
would take if he were minded to make an investment for the benefit of other people for whom he 
felt morally bound to provide". Secondly, many of the cases are concerned with applications by 
trustees to courts, asking whether a particular investment in particular circumstances, is prudent. 
There are few decisions where beneficiaries have asserted that a trustee has breached its duty to 
invest prudently. 
lo6 Section 13C Trustee Act 1956. 
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case, it will be a matter of fact, ascertainable from the evidence before the court, 
whether a manager has exercised the care, diligence and skill required of it. 107 
The prudent person rule is a test of conduct rather than performance or result. The 
manager cannot be viewed as a guarantor of the trust fund108 and the mere fact of 
loss does not necessarily imply that an imprudent investment has been made. 
The general thrust of the rule is that it is the manner in which the manager acts in 
choosing investments which is of chief importance. If a manager exercises the 
reasonable care and skill that a prudent person engaged in the business of investing 
would exercise in managing the affairs of others, it will not be liable if the investment 
turns out badly. 
6.2.1 Duty to Diversify 
An important question that requires clarification is whether the manager is under a 
duty to distribute the risk of loss of the unit trust funds' capital, by reasonable 
diversification of the investment portfolio.109 The Trustee Act does not state that the 
manager is under a duty to diversify. However, section 13E110 sets out matters which 
the manager may have regard to in exercising its powers of investment. The first of 
these matters is the "desirability of diversifying trust investments. "111 
107 The "legal list" was replaced by tJ1e "prudent person rule" after ilie Joint Working Party recom-
mended that the difficulties with ilie legal list were sufficiently serious to justify abandoning iliat 
approach in favour of a principle whid1, iliough less precise, was more suited to modern investment 
conditions see Joint Working Party "Trustee Investment - The Prudent Man Approach?" Report of ilie 
Joint Working Party Department of Justice 1986 para 13. 
108 Re Chapman; Cocks v Cbapman [18961 2 Ch 763, 775. 
I09 For a discussion on tl1e meaning of "diversification" see McSwain "Prudent Diversification : Suggested 
Solutions for Trust Investors" (1967) 106 Trust & Es 845, 846; H E Bines "Modem Portfolio Theory" 
below n 112. 
110 Trustee Act 1956. 
111 Section 13E(l)(a), above n 109. 
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The Modem Portfolio Theory112, which is widely accepted by professional fund 
managers throughout the world, dictates that maximised diversification is essential to 
eliminate the consequences of risk and to achieve an "efficient" portfolio. It is 
submitted that as a matter of course managers should have regard to the desirability 
of diversification113 and that it will be necessary for a manager to be able to justify 
why in their view it was not prudent to diversify in any particular case or why the 
manager did not diversify more or less. 
Other matters that may justify why the manager did not diversify ( or diversify more 
or less ) are set out in Section 13E. These are: 
(i) The nature of the existing trust investments. 
(ii) The need to maintain the real value of the capital or income of the trust. 
(iii) The risk of capital loss or depreciation. 
(iv) The likely income return. 
(v) The term of the investment. 
(vi) The duration of the trust. 
(vii) The marketability of the investment. 
(viii)The aggregate value of the trust fund. 
(ix) Tax liability. 
(x) The likelihood of inflation affecting the investment or trust fund. 
112 It is neither within the scope of this paper, nor is the author competent, to discuss the technicalities of 
the Modern Portfolio TI1eory. See W A Lee "Modern Portfolio Theory and the Investment of Pension 
Funds" in F,quity and Commercial Relationships P D Finn (ed) Law Book Co Ltd (1987) 284, 298; F J 
Finn and P A Ziegler "Prudence and Fiduciary Delegations in the Investment of Trust Funds" (1987) 61 
A L J 329, 334; H E Bines "Modern Portfolio Theory (1976) 76 Columbia L Rev 721, 743". 
113 A duty to diversify m::iy be imposed by the trust deed or by a court. 
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6.2.2 The Courts Approach : One or All? 
When managers invest trust funds they generally attempt to reduce the possible risk 
to which the capital is exposed. This may be done by selecting some investments that 
are by themselves speculative but in combination with other investments form a 
secure portfolio. This attempt to mask the consequences of risk is called co-
variance.114 However, will the New Zealand courts recognise such portfolio 
investment strategies? The situation that may arise is best illustrated by an example. 
An action may be brought by an aggrieved unitholder in the following way. 
A unitholder alleges that the manager has breached its duty to invest prudently 
because one particular investment (A) was very risky and therefore imprudent. The 
manager on the other hand claims in its defence that its portfolio investment strategy 
was such that the risk of A failing was accounted for by other investments (B,C,D). 
The courts have shown a tendency to test whether a trustee had breached its duty to 
invest prudently by reference to each investment taken individually115 as opposed to 
considering an entire investment strategy and ascertaining whether the investment, in 
the context of that strategy was prudent. 
However in a recent English High Court decision116 Hoffman J recognised the merits 
of investment strategies where His Honour stated: 
Modem trustees acting within their investment power are entitled to be 
judged by the standards of current portfolio theory, which emphasises the 
risk level of the entire portfolio rather than the risk attaching to each 
investment taken in isolation ... an investment which in isolation is too 
risky and therefore in breach of trust may be justified when held in 
conjunction with orher investments. 
114 Above n 112. 
115 For example see Astbwy v Beasley (1869) 17 WR 638. 
116 Nestle v National Westmi11Ster Bank pie Unreported 29 June 1988 noted by N Clayton "The Duty of a 
Trustee to be Prudent :ind Fair" [1988] 6 JBL 284. 
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The Trustee Act encourages courts (where appropriate) to take into account 
investment strategies in any action against a trustee for a breach of its duty to act 
prudently. 117 However, it is submitted that in any action against a unit trust manager 
for a breach of duty to invest prudently the court should always consider the 
manager's investment strategy. A failure to do so would be to disregard the working 
parties intentions'118 and the commercial reality of how managers operate. 
6.2.3 Is a High Risk Unit Trust Imprudent? 
A manager may propose putting together a portfolio of extremely risky investments 
and offering units to the public. Suppose the investments were oil futures, an 
investment generally seen as not being an investment a prudent person would make 
when investing on behalf of others. Because the portfolio is made up of such high 
risk investments (and assuming the manager fulfils the disclosure requirements set out 
in the Unit Trusts Act) can the portfolio be said to be imprudent and in breach of the 
provisions of the Trustee Act? Or can it be said that because all of the investors have 
been fully informed they will realise the risk that they will be taking and therefore 
section 13C only requires the manager to manage the otherwise imprudent 
investments as a prudent person of its same skill would, in investing in those 
investments for others. 
In the author's view the manager, in selling units, does not owe duties to potential 
unitholders to either enquire about the investor's financial status, or to enquire 
whether in fact the unit trust scheme which is being marketed (low, medium or high 
risk) is suitable for that particular investors circumstances. The manager is required 
by statute119 to disclose certain information to the public, and, having fulfilled those 
117 Section 13M Trustee Act 1956. 
118 Above n 107, 12 para 20. 
119 Above n 22. 
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requirements need not make further inquiry or disclosure (in the absence of a duty of 
care in equity or tort) . 
It may be arguable, however, in the oil futures portfolio scenario that the manager 
owes a duty of care to investors to ensure that they are fully aware of the risk of loss, 
a duty over and above that imposed by the Unit Trusts Act. Disclosure of the risk of 
loss would no doubt be prudent. 
The prudent person rule is a test of the manager's conduct, ( ie how the manager 
carries out its investment functions) . Therefore, as long as the investors in the oil 
futures portfolio are fully informed of the high risk, and the manager makes those 
investments as any other prudent manager would make in the circumstances, then 
the manager could not be seen to be in breach of trust. 
This anomaly arises because the Trustee Act applies to all trusts and not only 
investment trust schemes. The courts have shown a very conservative approach to 
investment, generally looking at the elimination of risk as the most important factor. 
For the traditional trust this view is understandable because without the capital there 
can be no income. In the traditional trust, a trust is set up by the settlor for 
beneficiaries who give no consideration for the benefit. The appointed trustees are 
required to invest and manage the trust fund vested in them on behalf of those 
beneficiaries. TI1e trust's objectives are typically that the capital of the trust fund 
should not be placed at risk and that there should be a moderate income earned. 
In the unit trust transaction, the trusts objectives are different. The settlor sets up a 
high, medium or low risk scheme to meet the demand of investors. The beneficiaries 
give consideration and unlike the traditional trust have a choice of a number of trusts 
to invest in to meet their apparent needs. 
In a recent case regarding superannuation120 the Court of Appeal recognised the 
difference in nature between traditional trusts and trusts for a commercial purpose. 
Richardson J stated (by way of obiter dicta) that the contractual and commercial 
origins of pension schemes makes a practical and purposive approach to interpreting 
such documents appropriate. 
120 Re UEB; UEB Industries Ltd v Brabant (1991) 1 NZSC 40,243. 
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This "purposive approach" is to be commended. It is submitted that the courts 
should apply this approach, to recognise the commercial structure of unit trusts and 
that a particular unit trust's objectives may differ from those of a traditional trust, 
when considering whether a manager has acted prudently under the prudent person 
rule. This is not an introduction of special rules for commercial trusts but a 
recognition of their specific purposes so that reasonable and practical effect can be 
given to the obligations created by the trust deeds121 or implied by statute. 
7 THE TRUSTEE'S DUfIES 
In the unit trust transaction the trustee's role is generally to ensure the safe custody of 
trust funds and once investments are made, to hold the title to those assets. 
The trustee will generally have a duty to collect the income from investments and 
ensure that it is distributed to unitholders in accordance with the unit trust deed. It 
also has a duty to hold the register of unitholders122 and keep and distribute annual 
audited accounts. 123 
The trustee has a general duty first to act continuously as trustee and not to do or 
omit to do anything which might cause it to be disqualified from acting as trustee and 
secondly to ensure that persons that have been delegated functions by it, duly 
perform the covenants and obligations required of them. 
Thus, the trustee takes only a passive role in the day to day running and management 
of the unit trust fund and in this regard its duties are different from a traditional trust. 
Jessel MR illustrated the need for the courts to look at the circumstances of each trust 
when His Honour stated in Earl of Egmount v Smith, 124 "it is a fallacy to suppose that 
every trustee has the same duties and liabilities". It is submitted that the "purposive 
approach" discussed in 6.2.3. is equally relevant when deciding whether trustees have 
fulfilled their duties. 
121 See J K Maxton "Who is Entitled to a Superannuation Surplus?" [1992] NZ Recent Law Review 210. 
122 Section 3(3) Unit Trusts Act 1960. 
123 Section 11 Unit Trusts Act 1960. 
124 (1877) 6 Ch:O 469, 475. 
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7 .1 Duty to Supervise the Manager 
Of greatest significance is the duty, implied into every unit trust deed by the Unit 
Trusts Act, that the trustee shall not act on any direction of the manager to acquire or 
dispose of any property in the unit trust, if, in the trustee's opinion (conveyed in 
writing to the manager) the proposed acquisition or disposal of an investment is 
manifestly not in the best interests' of unitholders.125 
At this point it should be noted that in practice few managers instruct trustees to 
dispose or acquire property. Generally, the manager has the ability to authorise the 
sale and purchase of the unit trust's investments without reference to the trustee. In 
logistical terms this is the most practical approach - saving the double handling of 
work which the manager is better qualified to perform. 
This is not to say that the manager has a carte blanche reign. Trustees generally 
prepare, and issue, guidelines to the managers which set out the percentages of the 
authorised investments that may be bought at any one time. These guidelines ensure 
the integrity of the portfolio strategy. 
Most trustees are of the view that if the guidelines are regularly updated, and the 
manager follows the guidelines carefully, 126 then the trustee will be fulfilling its duty 
to ensure that investments are not manifestly not in the best interests of unitholders. 
This chapter is concerned with whether this view is well founded and what exactly 
the duty entails. 
Although the trustee has a duty to act in the best interests127 of unitholders, it is not 
the duty of the trustee to invest the unit trust fund prudently. This is the job of the 
manager. 128 However, as set out earlier, the Unit Trusts Act imposes upon the Trustee 
125 Section 12(1Xc) Unit Trusts Act 1960. 
126 The manager, with agreement from trustee can generally work outside the guidelines. 
127 Cowan v Scargill [1985] 3 ChD 270 for a definition of "best interests". 
128 Above 6.1 where the manager's duties when selling units are discussed . 
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a duty to supervise the manger in carrying out its investment function. The duty is a 
subjective one requiring the trustee to veto proposed sales or purchases of investment 
if, in its opinion such an action is manifestly not in the best interests of unitholders 
("the duty to supervise"). 
7.1.1 Does the Trustee Need to be Involved in Every 
Transaction? 
The purpose of the duty to supervise is in futherance of the purpose of the Unit 
Trusts Act to protect the interests of unitholders. However, with unit trusts becoming 
increasingly sophisticated trustees are required to have a detailed understanding of 
the nature of the investments and the investment strategy. The issue of guidelines by 
trustees' attempts to circumvent, the duty to supervise which, on a strict reading of 
the Unit Trust Act, would require constant daily monitoring by the trustee of the 
manager, and for the trustee to have equivalent management expertise. Common 
sense suggests, that such a requirement would be impractical, costly and inefficient. 
In the author's view, provided that a trustee issues regularly revised guidelines 
reflecting the investment strategy devised by the manager, and in the trustee's opinion 
that strategy is prudent, then the trustee does not need to be constantly involved in 
the running of the unit trust. It is submitted that coupled with strict audit requirements 
of the manager's activities the trustee can satisfactorily monitor the performance of the 
manager. 
Essential to the duty to supervise is the need for the trustee to have access to 
information. The Unit Trusts Act provides that any information relating to the unit 
trust must be produced to the trustee129 by the manager, on demand. 
With the ability of investment portfolios values to rise and fall so quickly, managers 
and trustees cannot be required to be guarantors or clairvoyants. As long as the 
trustee remains fully informed of the financial position of the unit trust and queries 
129 Section 12(1)(b) (i),( ii). 
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any untoward transaction in breach of the guidelines then it will fulfil its duty to 
supervise. The case of Bartlett & Ors v Barclays Bank Trust Company Ltmtted 130 may 
illustrate the position that a New Zealand Court would take. 
In that case, the settlor placed upon trust properly consisting of debenture stock and 
company shares. The trustee was the defendant bank. The company shares were in a 
property owning company and after a change in the board of that company, the 
directors decided to engage in a speculative property development through another 
company as a project vehicle. 
After substantial losses on the development project were incurred the beneficiaries of 
the trust claimed that the defendant trustee was liable to make good to the trust all 
losses because it had permitted the two companies to engage in property 
development. 
Brightman J held that a prudent trustee must see that he has sufficient information to 
enable him to make a responsible decision from time to time whether to let matters 
proceed or to intervene if it is dissatisfied. 131 This does not mean the monitoring of 
every move of the directors, but of making it reasonably probable, so far as the 
circumstances permit, so that the trustee receives an adequate flow of information, 132 
a means by which to safeguard the interests' of the beneficiaries. 
Furthermore, where the trustee holds itself out as having, a special skill it will be 
liable for a breach of trust if it does not exercise the care and skill it professes to 
possess. 133 On the facts of the Bartlett case His Honour held that had the defendant 
130 [1980) 2 WLR 430. 
131 Above n 130, 432. 
132 Above n 130, 433. 
133 Above n 130,434. 
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been in receipt of more information it would have been able to step in and stop, and 
ought to have stopped, the speculative and imprudent project and therefore, it failed 
in its duty to the beneficiaries. 134 
With respect to a trustee intervening to stop a manager's actions, it is always a matter 
of degree at what point a transaction will be manifestly not in the best interests' of 
unitholders. Although the facts of the Bartleet case are distinguishable from the unit 
trust scenario, in that the manager has the duty to invest prudently, it is submitted that 
the decision is important in terms of the trustee's duty of supervision of the manager. 
The duty to supervise is greater than that imposed by the Trustee Act upon a trustee 
for the acts of agents. In that situation the trustee will not be liable for any loss or 
acts of an agent if the agent is employed in good faith. 135 The trustee can seek 
indemnification for the agent's acts provided that any loss caused is not through the 
trustee's wilful default. 136 
7.1.2 Does a breach of trust require intervention by the 
trustee? 
In a fluctuating market, a manager may wish to purchase investments that are outside 
the guidelines or, in exceptional cases, the authorised investment list. In both cases, 
without reference to the trustee, this will generally be a prima facie breach of the unit 
trust deed. It is not necessarily, manifestly not in the best interests of unitholders, 
therefore, requiring intervention. The manager may believe that the investment is a 
prudent one. For example, in a property unit trust, where property values are 
plummeting, if the manager realises a property at market value, and purchases 
134 Above n 130, 435. 
135 Section 29(1) Trustee Act 1956. 
136 Section 38, Trustee Act 1956. For a discussion of the meaning of "wilful default" see J E Stannard 
"Wilful Default" [1979] Conv 345; see also H A J Ford and WA Lee above n 66, para 965. 
35 
government stock (an unauthorised investment) because in the manager's view 
government stock will give a higher return than reinvestment in property, this will not 
be manifestly not in the best interests of unitholders. 
Conversely, if a manager does abide strictly by the guidelines, and acts within the 
investment strategy, a trustee may still have a duty to intervene in the event of an 
unexpected negative change in the market. The likelihood of the need for such an 
intervention can be and generally is, minimised further by a portfolio investment 
strategy and a requirement that the manager issue a certificate to the trustee, on a 
regular basis, stating that it has complied with the guidelines. 
It is submitted that the trustee will only need to intervene in exceptional 
circumstances and in those cases, the prudence of the manager would be also in 
doubt. This view is not only practical but in keeping with the policy of the Unit 
Trusts Act. 
8 LIABILITY OF MANAGER AND TRUSTEE FOR BREACH OF 
STATUfORY DUTY, AND NEGLIGENCE 
In the event of a collapse of a unit trust, unitholders will generally seek to ascertain 
who is responsible for the collapse. Inevitably, unitholders bringing an action will 
attempt to claim against both the manager and the trustee for their loss, under as 
many causes of action as are available to them. 
This chapter deals with the question of whether a unitholder may bring an action 
against a manager and/ or trustee for a breach of statutory duty and negligence in 
addition to an action for breach of trust. And whether a manager or trustee may 
claim contribution from the other party. 
This point was discussed in the recent New Zealand case of Fletcher v National 
Mutual Life Nominees Ltd37 in the context of the Securities Act. The facts of that 
cases may be stated briefly. 
137 [1990) 1 NZLR 97. 
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AIC Securities Ltd ("AIC") had carried on business as a money market operator in the 
course of which it invited subscriptions from the public. To enable AIC to undertake 
such business the Securities Act 1978 required that a trustee be appointed for the 
depositors in AIC. AIC appointed National Mutual Life Nominees Ltd ("National 
Mutual"). Deloitte Haskins & Sells ("Deloitte") were AIC's auditors.The AIC Group 
collapsed and AIC was unable to repay its depositors. The plaintiff brought an action 
against National Mutual for breaches of its obligations. National Mutual accepted it 
was negligent and settled out of court with the depositors. National Mutual joined 
Deloitte and claimed a contribution from Deloitte as joint tortfeasors on the grounds 
that: 
(i) Deloittes breached a common law duty of care and a statutory duty under 
section 50(2) of the Securities Act; 
(ii) National Mutual and Deloitte owed common duties of care to the depositors; and 
(iii) Deloitte owed a duty of care to National Mutual in respect of the accuracy of 
accounts in the AIC prospectus. 
Only the first two grounds are relevant to this discussion. In a reserve judgment 
Henry J held that the relationship between National Mutual and the AIC depositors 
was one of trustee/ beneficiary and that National Mutual's liability to depositors arose 
from breaches of trust, not tort. Thus, National Mutual's claim for contribution could 
not succeed because the law does not provide for contribution for concurrent wrongs 
(except in tort), nor mixed concurrent wrongs. 
On the breach of statutory duty issue, His Honour held that a breach of the Securities 
Regulations (Regulation 24), which deem certain clauses to be contained in every 
trust deed, (like section 12 of the Unit Trusts Act) was a breach of the trust deed and 
that a failure to exercise reasonable diligence in the ways specified in the deemed 
clause becomes a breach of trust not a tortous breach of statutory duty.138 
138 Above n 137, 103. 
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His Honour went on to hold that apart from the trust deed National Mutual had no 
relationship with the depositors that would give rise to a duty of care. A depositor 
must bring an action for a breach of trust against a trustee, in equity, and it was not 
open to a depositor to claim negligence under the jurisdiction of the common law. 
The effect of this judgment, when it is applied to the unit trust transaction, is that 
unitholders must bring their action, for a breach of trust by the manager or the trustee 
in equity. It is not open for the unitholders to argue that the manager or trustee were 
negligent in carrying out their functions139 i.e. the manager and / or trustee cannot be 
concurrently liable in tort and equity. 
In turn, a manager or trustee cannot argue that the other party, as the case may be, 
should contribute to any claim against it because such a claim is only available to 
joint tortfeasors.140 
In light of some of the New Zealand Court of Appeal's dicta in recent times regarding 
concurrent liability in tort and contract141 and the fact equity and common law have 
been pleaded in several recent cases142 without objection, Henry ]'s view has levied 
some criticism. 143 
139 The question whether the manager or trustee may be liable in tort for inducing or procuring a breach 
of trust has been left open in New Zealand. See Kupe Group Ltd v Ariadne Australia Ltd, (High 
Court Auckland, C 151/88, 10 July 1989, Barker J); and Metal/ & Robstoff AG v Donaldson Lufkin & 
Jenrette Inc (19881 3 All ER 116. 
140 Above n 137, 104; see also Section 170Xc) Law Reform Act 1936; compare with S.1(1) Civil Liability 
(Contribution) Act 1978 where a person who is liable whatever the legal basis of his or her liability 
may claim contribution; see articles on contribution set out in CEF Rickett "Trust or Tort? Tort and 
Trust? Some Questions About Civil Liability" (1990) NZ Recent Law Review 259. 
141 Day v Mead (1987) 2 NZLR 443; Elders Pastoral Ltd v Bank of New Zealand [1989) 2 NZLR 180; 
Attorney-General for the United Kingdom v Wellington Newspapers Ltd (1988) 1 NZLR 129; 
Aquaculture Corp v New Zealand Green Mussell Co Ltd (CA 69/87, 11 June 1990); Rowlands v Co/low 
(1992) 1 NZLR 178, all of which indicate a fusion of the common law and equity. 
142 Sbivas v Bank of New Zealand (1990) 3 NZBLC 101,540; for example Kupe Group Ltd v Ariadne 
Australia Ltd above n 139. 
143 C E F Rickett, above n 140. 
38 
In Mouat v Clarke Boyce144 Cooke P stated that the common law and equity are 
mingled and that a duty of care is identical whether derived from theoretical sources 
of tort, contract, or equity or from all of them in a situation where they overlap. It is 
submitted that Henry ]'s findings in the Fletcher case will not be sustainable against 
the Court of Appeal's willingness to impose a duty of care on a party where the 
justice of the case requires an appropriate remedy. 
The Fletcher case severely limits the causes of action available to unitholders. 
However, if the Fletcher case is correct it is submitted the courts, being faced with 
such a restriction, would be more ready to find a breach of trust by placing a lower 
standard of proof on unitholders in proving a breach of trust and a higher standard 
upon managers and trustees in fulfilling their duties. It is also less likely that the 
courts, pursuant to the Trustee Act, 145 would excuse a manager or a trustee for a 
breach of trust. 146 
Although the Unit Trusts Act, in keeping with the policy of the legislature to protect 
unitholders as if they were shareholders in a company, allows a Court to assess 
damages against delinquent directors of the manager, in the event of a winding-up147 
causes of action in equity and at common law should be available to unitholders. 
Furthermore, there is a need for the Law Reform Act 1936 to be amended to enable 
managers and trustees to claim contribution regardless of the legal basis of their 
1 iabil ity. 148 
144 (1992] 2 NZLR 559,564 
145 Section 73 Trustee Act 1956. 
146 National Trustees Company of Australasia Ltd v General Finance Company of Australasia Ltd (1905] 
AC 373 where the Privy Council held that the appellants who were professional trustees although 
they acted honestly and reasonably ought not be excused. 
147 Section 27 Unit Trusts Act 1960. 
148 Above n 140. 
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9 REGUIATION OF UNIT TRUSTS IN AUSTRALIA 
It is not within the scope of this paper to study extensively the Australian legislation 
relating to unit trusts. However, an understanding of the regulations pertaining to 
unit trusts in Australia is important for three reasons. First, the Unit Trusts Act 1966 
does not apply to Australian unit trusts marketed in New Zealand, those unit trusts 
being governed by the provisions relating to "participatory securities" under the 
Securities Act. 149 Secondly, with the Australian and New Zealand Governments having 
undertaken to build closer economic and commercial relationships,150 the 
harmonisation of the two countries' laws in respect of securities regulation is possible 
in the near future. Thirdly, the Unit Trusts Act 1960 was based151 on the New South 
Wales and State of Victoria152 provisions relating to unit trusts, and the legislation that 
now governs the operation of unit trusts is substantially similar to the Unit Trusts Act. 
The Australian decisions, 153 many of which have been discussed earlier in this paper, 
are therefore of more assistance to the New Zealand unit trust industry and the New 
Zealand courts than any other jurisdiction. 
A unit in a unit trust is regarded as a "prescribed interest" under the Australian 
Corporations Law. The Australian Corporations Law154 governs the offering of 
"prescribed interests" to the public and provides that the funds be held by an 
149 Some Australian unit trusts are exempt from the provisions relating to prospectuses under the 
Securities Act 1978. See Securities Act (Australian Unit Trusts) Exemption Notice 1991 (SR 1991/ 19). 
150 Article 1 of the Closer Economic Relations Treaty, executed on 28.3.1984 to be effective as from 
1.1.1983. 
151 Parliamentary Debates 324 (30 August 1960), 1923 and 325 (19 October 1960) 3086. 
152 Companies Act 1958 (Viet) ss 284-293; see also the Anderson Committee Report (Report of the 
Departmental Conunittee appointed by the Board of Trade, 1936 Cmnd 5529). 
153 Perpetual Trustees v Corporate West Management LJd ( 1989) WAR 117 (power of beneficiaries to alter 
trust deed); In Parkes Management Limited v Perpetual Trustee Co & P T Ltd (1977) ACLC 29,545 
(division of duties of manager and trustee); Elders Trustee and F.xecutor Co LJd v Reeves (EG) Pty LJd 
and Ors (1987) 78 ALR 193 (managers role); Re Application of Permanent Trustee Nominees (Can-
berra) Ltd above n 82, (division of duties of manager and trustee). 
154 Part 7.12 Div 5. 
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approved trustee155 and managed by a management company pursuant to an 
approved deed. 156 That trust deed must contain specific covenants imposing functions 
and duties upon the management company and the trustee,157 these are substantially 
similar to those imposed by the Unit Trusts Act with the exception that the manager 
does not have the duties of the trustee imposed on it in carrying out its functions by 
the statute. As a result, there has been a great deal of debate as to whether the 
manager has such duties.158 In this regard, the New Zealand Act is more certain than 
the Australian legislation. 
Collective investment schemes are at present under review in Australia159 in an 
attempt to ascertain the appropriate legal framework under which they should 
operate. Unit trusts form part of collective investment schemes. At the time of 
writing , no recommendations on the legal framework that those schemes should take 
had been given. 
10 REFORM 
In 1990 and 1991 the Securities Commission in conjunction with the Trustee 
Companies Association, Unit Trusts Association of New Zealand, and a number of 
other organisations frequently met to discuss issues relating to unit trusts with a view 
to recommending to the Minister of Justice, the most effective legal framework under 
which unit trusts should operate. A number of suggestions were made by each 
member of the group but no formal proposals were made. However in view of the 
155 Corporations Law (Clth) s1067(4). 
156 Corporations Law (Clth) s1062(2). 
157 Corporations Law (Clth) s1069(11). 
158 Above n 82. 
159 "Collective Investment Schemes" Australian law Reform Commission, Companies and Securities 
Advisory Committee Issues Paper 10, September 1991. 
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present attempts to harmonise the laws of Australia and New Zealand further 
discussions may take place after the Australian Law Reform Commission makes its 
formal recommendations on collective investment schemes. 
It is worthy to note that agreement was not reached by the New Zealand group as to 
whether the offering of unit trusts should be retained under the Unit Trusts Act, 
included within the Securities Act 1978 or whether a totally new act regulating all 
collective investment schemes should be enacted. 
Assuming that the government's policy will continue to be the protection of 
unitholders the most appropriate way of regulating unit trusts maybe to have an act 
governing all collective investment schemes. Such an act should provide investors in 
such schemes with standard, high quality information allowing them to make 
informed and comparative decisions. It should also standardise the duties of trustees 
and (where appropriate) managers and clearly set out the remedies available to 
investors. The same result could also be achieved by placing all collective investment 
schemes in the Securities Act. 
There would be advantages in placing the regulation of unit trusts in the Securities 
Act. First, it would bring the offering of almost all publicly offered securities under 
one Act. Secondly, at present the unit trust is still subject to some provisions of the 
Securities Act, and for ease of reference it would be appropriate to have reference 
only to one Act. Thirdly, the use of trustees is not foreign to the Securities Act and 
therefore the case law in this area could be of benefit to practitioners, claimants, and 
the judiciary. Fourthly, it would be beneficial for the protection of unitholders to 
have the Securities Commission as a supervisor of the industry. Fifthly, in terms of the 
disclosure requirements under the Unit Trusts Act, these could be aligned to the 
Securities Act requirements, giving investors a better quality of relevant information 
by which to make a choice. 160 
160 The information relevant to unitholders may be different to that which is relevant to investors in 
other classes of securities. For example, accounts setting out transactions are not important to 
unitholders. The managemant fees authorised investments, management performance, and objectives 
are of primary importance to unitholders. 
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Regardless of the legal framework under which unit trusts should operate a number 
of issues require clarification by the legislature to ensure that all of the parties 
involved with unit trusts are aware of their rights, functions, and duties. In summary 
these are: 
(i) The need for better disclosure in prospectus documents to enable investors to 
make an informed and comparative decision about unit trust investments; 
(ii) The need to separate out, and clarify the extent of the manager's and trustee's 
duties including the need for the statute to state that the provisions set out in 
section 13 of the Trustee Act 1956 specifically apply to managers; 
(iii) The possibility of renaming the manager and trustee, to correctly reflect their 
responsibilities, 
(iv) The need to clarify whether the manager and trustee will be liable in equity, 
contract and tort, to unitholders and whether the parties have a right to claim 
contribution for any liability contributed to by that party. 
This paper has suggested possible ways by which these issues maybe clarified to 
reduce the risk of loss to investors and to enable managers and trustees to perform 
their functions efficiently, and cost effectively while safeguarding the interests of 
investors. 
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11 CONCLUSION 
Unit trusts are an effective investment option for individual investors. However the 
legal framework under which they operate is broad and imprecise. The courts when 
adjudicating on the functions and duties of managers and trustees, of unit trusts, must 
do so against the background of how they operate in practice. To interpret the 
manager's and trustee's duties too strictly could lead to a decline in the use of unit 
trusts because managers and trustees maybe reluctant to take on overly onerous 
duties. For those managers and trustees who are prepared to take on the 
responsibility the cost of fulfilling such duties could be excessive and uncompetitive 
with other forms of investment scheme. 
A balance is therefore required between commercial and practical reality and the 
need to protect the interests' of investors. This is no easy task, but one which could 
be assisted by reform. 
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